From an inference perspective, this makes it difficult to assess causal direction, and it is unlikely that most survey respondents reliably separate the two concepts when answering questions. For most new citizens, socialization into a new national community and new state happen simultaneously. Second, empirically distinguishing between attitudes toward the nation versus state is challenging, since the two are often conflated in practice. While surveys on non-controversial topics such as health, employment, or social life are common, it is harder to obtain a large enough sample for more sensitive surveys that ask about political attitudes. First, explicitly political surveys of the defector population are rare. Understanding the different bases for democratic duty among defectors has important policy implications, but has received little empirical attention for two reasons. The aim of this article is to empirically assess these different frameworks in the context of North Korean defectors. In this framework, it is attachment to a national people-and the sense of collective obligation that it instills-that drives a sense of duty to a democratic state, not necessarily aspects of state performance or treatment. Specifically, liberal national theorists claim that ethical ties to a national community can serve as the foundation for loyalty to a specific democratic state (Tamir 1995). The other side of that debate, tracing back to ideas of civic republicanism, claims that a different pathway exists in the intrinsic power of identity. Yet the contractual approach represents only one side of a rich debate among political theorists about the sources of political obligation. Indeed, this is the view that implicitly undergirds South Korea's resettlement policies, which focus predominantly on providing material aid through living, housing, and medical subsidies, as well as job and education assistance. As individuals receive satisfactory deliverables or treatment from the state, the argument is that political trust builds, and more are willing to reciprocate by complying with state demands. What motivates a sense of democratic obligation? The conventional view has been that political duty in liberal democracies can be fostered through a positive “give-and-take” with the state. Whether the influx of North Koreans becomes a supportive or disruptive force to South Korea and other receiving democracies will depend significantly on this aspect of their democratic development. For host democracies, it matters that new citizens come to see such roles as their responsibility, even in the absence of austere and authoritarian sanctions. Instead, democracies must often rely on the voluntary willingness of citizens to fulfill political roles such as voting, staying informed, or even paying honest taxes when monitoring is limited. One of the key features that sets apart democracies from non-democracies is the strict limitation on how they can coerce citizens. But from a basic functionalist perspective, it is important that new members internalize a sense of responsibility for the roles of the democratic citizen. In this context, understanding how North Korean defectors develop into responsible and responsive democrats is intimately tied to stabilizing the region's democratic future, especially as the potential breakdown of North Korea seems to loom larger than ever.īecoming a democrat is a complicated process. The smooth integration of new citizens into the existing polity is an important part of how “democracy becomes routinized and deeply internalized” toward further consolidation (Linz and Stepan Reference Linz and Stepan1996, 5). The democratic adaptability of North Korean defectors has direct implications for political stability in South Korea, but also more generally for host democracies receiving an increasing number of refugees fleeing from authoritarian contexts. While some defectors become active participants in South Korea's democracy, others withdraw almost entirely from politics, becoming dead weight in the democratic process (Go Reference Go2014). Yet great variation exists on this score. However, surprisingly little is known about their political adaptation from one of the most stringent and closed off authoritarian regimes to a democracy. Numerous studies have examined the economic, psychological, and health related aspects of this population's resettlement. More than 29,000 North Koreans currently reside in South Korea, according to the Ministry of Unification ( 2017), a number that has grown rapidly since the early 2000s. North Korean defector, male, 39 years old Author interview, July 13, 2013 You are not loyal to your family because of what it gives you. Have you ever seen real loyalty come from money? No, never. They say South Korean tax money paid for your house, your clothes, your life here, so you owe your loyalty to this country now.
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